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Abstract
We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players
try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns
occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high
or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we nd that the cooperative value
function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the ecient cut-o belief. This nding
extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov
perfect equilibria. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium, construct a
class of asymmetric equilibria, and elucidate the impact of bad versus good Poisson
news on equilibrium outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The adoption of new technologies crucially hinges upon an assessment of the risks they
might entail. It is very important, therefore, to obtain accurate information about the
frequency of critical events, their severity, the size of the associated costs, etc. On a smaller
scale, the introduction of a new production process or machine in a manufacturing plant
will be based at least partly on the expected frequency with which the equipment fails
and on the expected costs required to render it operational again. Similarly, a consumer's
decision to acquire an innovative household appliance or some novel hardware will depend
on an initial estimate of the product's reliability.
Once the new technology, process or equipment is in use, the assessment of its failure
rate will be continually revised on the basis of one's own experience and, possibly, that of
other users whose choices and results one may be able to observe. Each failure makes the
users more pessimistic, and a string of such events may eventually lead them to abandon
the exploration and switch to some alternative whose risks are better known.
We model this joint exploration process as a continuous-time game of strategic ex-
perimentation with identical two-armed bandits. The risky arm represents the `machine'
whose reliability is being explored. It imposes lump-sum costs at the jump times of a
Poisson process; the arrival rate of these `breakdowns' can be high or low, and is initially
unknown.1 The safe arm represents a machine with known costs per unit of time. If the
risky machine is good, that is, if it fails at the lower rate, it is cheaper to maintain than
the safe one; the opposite holds if the risky machine is bad.
We assume that the risky machines are either all good or all bad; conditional on
this common quality, lump-sum costs arrive according to independent Poisson processes.
The players can observe each other's choices and outcomes, so there is an informational
externality among them. To gauge its eects, we characterize the ecient strategy prole
and construct Markov perfect equilibria where the players' common assessment of the
unknown failure rate serves as the state variable.
We rst consider the case where a good risky machine never fails, so that any break-
down provides conclusive evidence of its being bad. In this case, ecient behaviour leads
to a value function that is continuous and piecewise linear with a single kink at the bound-
ary between the continuation and stopping regions. Thus, the cooperative value function
does not exhibit smooth pasting at the ecient cut-o belief. This nding extends to the
boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect equilibria of the
experimentation game.
1While the failure rate is exogenous in our model, Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2010)
consider a principal-agent problem in which this rate depends on the unobservable eort exerted by the
agent.
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With conclusive breakdowns, any such equilibrium leads to the ecient outcome on
the same interval of initial beliefs. At beliefs optimistic enough to let the risky arm dom-
inate the safe one in terms of expected current costs, in fact, the equilibrium path of play
is clearly the ecient one, with all players sticking to the risky arm as long as there is
no breakdown, and switching to the safe arm irrevocably as soon as a breakdown occurs.
At somewhat less optimistic beliefs, this action prole remains compatible with equilib-
rium (and induces a common value function equal to the planner's solution) up to the
point where a player whose opponents all play risky is just indierent; the corresponding
threshold belief depends on the number of players, but not on the precise structure of the
equilibrium being played. Backward induction from this threshold allows us to construct
equilibrium actions at more pessimistic beliefs and, despite the lack of smooth pasting, de-
termine the boundary of the stopping region. We compute the unique symmetric Markov
equilibrium, construct a class of asymmetric equilibria for two players, and indicate how
this construction generalizes to an arbitrary number of players.
In the case where a good risky machine also fails occasionally, breakdowns provide
inconclusive evidence of the true state of the world, and the belief held immediately
after a breakdown may still be optimistic enough to continue using the risky machine.
Put dierently, whether it is optimal to use the risky machine at a given belief now
depends on what would be the continuation payo after a breakdown { this renders
the analysis signicantly more dicult. Ecient behaviour is still given by a cut-o
strategy, but the optimal cut-o can no longer be computed in closed form. We show
that it is uniquely determined by the requirement that the associated total expected cost
function be continuous, that is, by value matching alone. We again establish existence
of a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium and characterize its properties, among
them continuity and monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we briey address
the construction of asymmetric equilibria.
Our model of breakdowns is isomorphic to the setup considered by Keller and Rady
(2010) except for the replacement of lump-sum payos (whose expected total net present
value players want to maximize) with lump-sum costs (and the corresponding minimiza-
tion objective); the special case of conclusive breakdowns corresponds to the setup with
fully revealing `breakthroughs' of Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). One might have conjec-
tured that a model of breakdowns (where news is bad) would lead to results that were just
mirror images of those arising in an otherwise identical model of breakthroughs (where
news is good), but this is not so.
Above all, the principle of smooth pasting does not apply here { value functions have a
kink at the boundary between the continuation and stopping regions. The reason for this
striking dierence lies in the behaviour of the process of posterior beliefs when started at
the boundary of the stopping region. Owing to the nite arrival rate of Poisson jumps,
there will almost surely be no news event (breakthrough or breakdown, respectively)
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over the next instant. In the `breakthroughs' case, no news is bad news, and the belief
thus immediately enters the interior of the stopping region (in the terminology of the
mathematical literature on optimal stopping, this means that the boundary is `regular');
in the `breakdowns' case, by contrast, no news is good news, and the belief moves away
from the stopping region. The lack of smooth pasting at the ecient cut-o conrms
the rule of thumb whereby the value function of a stopping problem is dierentiable at a
regular boundary, but not necessarily at an irregular one.2
In our framework, it is actually quite easy to understand why the cooperative value
function cannot be dierentiable at the ecient cut-o. At each point in time, the planner
compares the expected informational benet of using the risky arm with the expected
(shared) cost increment relative to the safe arm. Both depend on the planner's belief,
that is, the probability he assigns to the good state of the world. The informational
benet has two components, one capturing a gradual improvement in the overall outlook
if no breakdown occurs, the other a discrete deterioration if a breakdown does occur; the
former depends on the rst derivative of the value function with respect to the belief,
the latter on the dierence between the continuation value at the belief held immediately
after a breakdown and the value at the current belief. As is standard in this type of
problem, the interior of the continuation region (where beliefs are more optimistic than
the ecient cut-o) is characterized by the informational benet exceeding the expected
cost increment of using the risky arm, and the interior of the stopping region by the
converse inequality; at the cut-o itself, benets and costs are equal.
Now, the crucial insight is that in the interior of the stopping region, the informational
benet of experimentation is zero: in the absence of a breakdown, a planner `deviating' to
the risky arm would become slightly more optimistic, but then still not nd it optimal to
experiment; and if a breakdown did occur, the planner would nd himself even `deeper'
in the stopping region than before and hence see no reason to experiment either. As
a consequence, the benet of experimentation must possess a jump discontinuity at the
ecient cut-o, where the expected cost increment of using the risky arm is necessarily
positive. The discrete-deterioration component of this benet is continuous in the belief,
however, so it must be the gradual-improvement component that jumps, implying a jump
discontinuity in the rst derivative of the value function at the cut-o.3
2See Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), especially Chapters IV.9 and VI.23.
3In the scenario with breakthroughs, the benet of experimentation consists of a gradual-deterioration
and a discrete-improvement component, and as we approach the ecient cut-o from the interior of the
stopping region, the latter component is positive and increases monotonically, while the former component
is zero. This makes it possible for the discrete-improvement component alone to balance the opportunity
cost of experimentation at the ecient cut-o, so that the gradual-deterioration component { and hence
the rst derivative of the value function { is continuous there.
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This argument carries over to any player who chooses a best response against oppo-
nents whose actions change continuously with the players' common posterior belief, the
only dierence being that unlike the social planner, each individual player compares the
benet of experimentation with the full expected cost increment of using the risky arm,
not the shared one. Thus, the players' common value function in the symmetric equilib-
rium must have a kink at the threshold belief at which experimentation starts. And in an
asymmetric equilibrium where experimentation starts with only one player playing risky,
the value function of this player must have a kink at the corresponding threshold belief.4
Another dierence between good and bad news is that in the scenario with breakdowns,
the presence of other players always encourages experimentation in the sense that the
equilibrium continuation region is larger than that of a single agent experimenting in
isolation. While Keller and Rady (2010) established this encouragement eect for any
Markov equilibrium of the experimentation game with inconclusive breakthroughs, Keller,
Rady and Cripps (2005) had shown earlier that there is no such eect when breakthroughs
provide conclusive evidence of the risky arm being good. With inconclusive good news,
in fact, a player who experiments beyond the belief at which his opponents stop stands
to bring them `back into the game' if he has a breakthrough, and then benet from their
subsequent experiments. With conclusive breakthroughs, by contrast, those subsequent
experiments are worthless because a successful `pioneer' already knows everything there
is to know about the quality of the risky arm; any such pioneer thus faces the same trade-
o as a single agent experimenting in isolation, and no Markov perfect equilibrium can
involve experimentation beyond the single-agent cut-o. It is noteworthy, therefore, that
here we nd an encouragement eect even in the case where a single arrival of bad news is
conclusive. At second sight, this is fully in line with the nding in Keller and Rady (2010),
however: the absence of bad news (whether conclusive or not) represents inconclusive good
news, and this is what motivates players to venture beyond the single-agent cut-o belief.
Again for conclusive breakdowns, there are a number of further results that stand in
marked contrast to Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). To start with, the value of informa-
tion to players intent on playing the symmetric MPE is no longer positive in the entire
experimentation region: at relatively pessimistic prior beliefs in this region, the players
would reject a free signal that induces a small lottery over posterior beliefs.5 Moreover, it
is no longer the case that the common outcome in the symmetric Markov perfect equilib-
rium is uniformly dominated by the average outcome in an asymmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium that has each player use one arm exclusively at any given belief. In asymmet-
ric equilibria, nally, players who free-ride on the information generated by others when
4Typically, it will have further kinks at more optimistic beliefs where an opponent's action changes
discontinuously. This type of non-dierentiability is familiar from Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and
Keller and Rady (2010), and does not indicate a failure of the smooth-pasting principle.
5This nding carries over to inconclusive, but highly informative breakdowns.
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the opportunity cost of experimentation is high do not benet, but do worse than a player
who experiments there. We shall discuss each of these ndings in detail below.
In summary, the paper makes three main contributions. First, it shows that when
players learn from occasional bad-news events, the principle of smooth pasting applies
neither to the ecient benchmark nor to the Markov perfect equilibria of the experimen-
tation game; for conclusive breakdowns, this point is made in an elementary fashion and
by means of closed-form solutions. Second, the paper establishes existence and uniqueness
of a symmetric Markov equilibrium in a situation where (as in the case of inconclusive
bad news) neither smooth-pasting nor backward-induction techniques apply. Third, the
paper carefully elucidates the impact of good versus bad Poisson news in a multi-agent
bandit model.
After a discussion of the related literature, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2
sets up the model. Section 3 studies the ecient benchmark and Markov perfect equilibria
for conclusive breakdowns, Section 4 for inconclusive breakdowns. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
Our work is part of a growing literature on bandit-based games of learning and experi-
mentation. Assuming that the cumulative payo from the risky arm follows a Brownian
motion with unknown drift, Bolton and Harris (1999) prove existence of a unique sym-
metric Markov perfect equilibrium and show that it exhibits the encouragement eect.
Bolton and Harris (2000) characterize all Markov perfect equilibria of the undiscounted
limit of their model. Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010) maintain
the structure of the Bolton-Harris model, but replace Brownian payos with a compound
Poisson process; the connection of the present paper with these two articles has already
been discussed in detail.
Owing to their tractability, the learning dynamics associated with conclusive Poisson
news have repeatedly been used as building blocks for richer models. Examples of the
good-news variety are the models of R&D competition of Malueg and Tsutsui (1997) and
Besanko and Wu (2012), and the (discrete-time) nancial contracting model of Berge-
mann and Hege (1998, 2005). Decamps and Mariotti (2004) analyse a duopoly model of
irreversible investment with a learning externality and a public background signal that
produces conclusive bad news; since a rm stops learning once it is optimistic enough to
invest, the stopping boundary is regular, however, and so the smooth-pasting principle
applies.6 Strulovici (2010) investigates how individual experimentation on a two-armed
6Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) allow for moral hazard in the allocation of funds, Decamps and
Mariotti (2004) for privately observed investment costs. For further related work on strategic learning with
private information, see Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2007), Moscarini and Squintani (2010), Acemoglu,
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bandit interacts with collective decision making through voting. His benchmark model
assumes conclusive good news; in an extension, he allows for bad news and alludes to
the failure of smooth pasting. Klein and Rady (2011) allow the type of the risky arm to
be negatively correlated across players, so that good news for one player is bad news for
the other. They show that equilibrium value functions are discontinuous at the boundary
between adjacent intervals that both are absorbing for the learning dynamics { such pairs
of intervals do not exist in our model.
By their very nature, economic models of rational learning are closely related to models
of sequential testing in mathematical statistics. This link is especially tight in our case.
On the one hand, this is because the very rst formulation of smooth-pasting conditions
appears in Mikhalevich (1958), a paper dealing with the sequential testing of two simple
hypotheses about the unknown drift parameter of an observed Brownian motion.7 On the
other hand, the analysis of the corresponding problem for a Poisson process in Peskir and
Shiryaev (2000) provides the rst example for the failure of smooth pasting. Observing a
Poisson process whose unknown intensity can be either high or low, and revising beliefs in
exactly the same way as in our model, the decision maker in that paper faces the combined
task of stopping the process and deciding which of the two rates to `accept'; his objective
is to minimize a weighted sum of the observation costs and the probabilities of making
an error of the rst and second kind, respectively. The optimal continuation region lies in
between two threshold levels for the probability assigned to the high intensity. In between
Poisson jumps, this probability declines gradually, which makes the lower threshold a
regular stopping boundary and the upper threshold an irregular one. Correspondingly,
the optimal solution is found by imposing smooth pasting at the lower threshold, but only
continuous pasting at the upper threshold. With a dierent objective function, the social
optimum and best responses in the good-news scenario of Keller and Rady (2010) mirror
the situation at the lower threshold, while their bad-news counterparts in the present
paper mirror the situation at the upper threshold.
In the mathematical nance literature, several papers report a failure of smooth past-
ing in stopping problems where the underlying asset price follows a Levy process without
a Gaussian component; see Boyarchenko and Levendorski (2002) or Alili and Kyprianou
Bimpikis and Ozdaglar (2011), Bonatti and Horner (2011), Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011), Murto and
Valimaki (2011), and Heidhues, Rady and Strack (2012).
7Starting with Samuelson (1965), smooth-pasting conditions have been used extensively in (nancial)
economics to solve problems of optimal stopping or control of one-dimensional diusions; see Dumas
(1991), Dixit (1993), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for classic references, and Strulovici and Szydlowski
(2012) for a recent contribution. All these papers specify a diusion coecient that is bounded away
from zero, which ensures regularity of stopping boundaries (and hence smooth pasting) even when the
underlying process can jump; see Bayraktar and Xing (2012). A case in point is the single-agent bandit
model of Cohen and Solan (2012), where payos on the risky arm are given by a Levy process and
posterior beliefs follow a jump diusion.
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(2005) for the valuation of an American option, and Gapeev and Kuhn (2005) as well as
Baurdoux, Kyprianou and Pardo (2011) for the zero-sum stopping game played by the
holder and the issuer of a convertible bond. Outside this particular literature, we are
aware of only one paper that identies a lack of smooth pasting in an economically moti-
vated setting. Ludkovski and Sircar (2012) study optimal resource exploration in a model
where new discoveries occur according to a jump process whose intensity is given by the
exploration eort. Under a monopolist's optimal policy, costly exploration takes place
between two threshold levels for current reserves. As these reserves diminish in between
discoveries, the upper threshold is an irregular stopping boundary, and the value function
is not smooth there. The extension of the model to a Cournot duopoly with a `green'
second producer who has access to an inexhaustible but relatively expensive source is
analysed numerically only. Our paper is thus the rst in the economics literature to iden-
tify in a fully analytic fashion { and even in closed form when breakdowns are conclusive
{ a failure of smooth pasting in a continuous-time, non-zero-sum stochastic game.
Through the underlying theme of bad versus good news, our work is loosely linked
to a set of papers which investigate the impact of dierent signal structures on the equi-
libria of dynamic games with imperfect public monitoring. Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce
(1991) study a discrete-time repeated partnership game in which the players observe the
realization of a Poisson process. They nd that Poisson events conveying bad news, that
is, an increased likelihood of `cheating', lead to more ecient equilibria than Poisson
events conveying good news; in particular, only the bad-news case admits a non-trivial
limit equilibrium as the period length goes to zero. Among other results, Fudenberg and
Levine (2007) conrm this nding for a repeated commitment game with a long-run and
a short-run player. Faingold and Sannikov (2011) study continuous-time reputation dy-
namics in a game where a large player faces a population of small players. In the special
case where the public signals about the large player's behaviour are driven by a Poisson
process, the equilibrium is unique if Poisson events are good news; when they are bad
news, multiple equilibria are possible. Clearly, the modelling frameworks in these papers,
and the economic forces behind their results, are very dierent from ours.
In recent work that is closer to ours, Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2012) examine rep-
utation building by a seller when product quality (which can be either high or low) is
persistent and depends stochastically on past investments. Consumers learn about qual-
ity through Poisson signals; the probability that they assign to the high quality measures
the seller's reputation, and constitutes a natural state variable for Markov perfect equi-
libria. With conclusive bad news, incentives to invest increase in reputation and there is
a continuum of equilibria with divergent dynamics that lead, for the same reason as in
Klein and Rady (2011), to a discontinuous value function. With conclusive good news,
incentives to invest decrease in reputation, and there is a unique cut-o below which the
seller invests, leading to ergodic reputation dynamics and a continuous value function; this
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type of equilibrium is also shown to exist for a large class of inconclusive Poisson news.
Rather than solving the relevant Bellman equations, the authors analyse the seller's op-
timization problem by means of a path integral that represents the value of high quality.
As a consequence, pasting principles are not of the essence here.
2 A Model of Stochastic Breakdowns
The set-up of the model is that of Keller and Rady (2010) except for the fact that here
events occurring on the risky arm are bad news. The Bellman equations stated below
follow from exactly the same arguments as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005); see also
Davis (1993).
There are N  1 players, each of them endowed with one unit of a perfectly divisible
resource per unit of time, and each facing a two-armed bandit problem in continuous
time. The risky arm R generates lump-sum costs which are independent draws from a
time-invariant distribution on ]0;1[ with known mean h. If a player allocates the fraction
kt 2 [0; 1] of her resource to R over an interval of time [t; t + dt[ , the probability of such
a breakdown on R at some point in the interval is kt dt, where  = 1 if R is bad,  = 0
if R is good, and 1 > 0  0 are constants known to all players. Conditional on , the
arrival of lump-sum costs is independent across players. The fraction 1   kt allocated
to the safe arm S causes an expected cost of (1   kt)s dt, where s > 0 is a constant
known to all players. Therefore, the overall expected cost increment conditional on  is
[(1  kt)s+ kth] dt. We assume that 0h < s < 1h, so each player prefers R to S if R
is good, and prefers S to R if R is bad.
Players start with a common prior belief about the unknown state of the world . Ob-
serving each other's actions and outcomes, they hold common posterior beliefs throughout
time. With pt denoting the subjective probability at time t that players assign to the risky
arm being bad, a player's expected cost increment conditional on all available information
is [(1  kt)s+ kt(pt)h] dt with
(p) = p1 + (1  p)0:
Given a player's actions fktgt0 such that kt is measurable with respect to the information
available at time t, her total expected discounted cost, expressed in per-period units, is
E
Z 1
0
r e r t [(1  kt)s+ kt(pt)h] dt

;
where the expectation is over the stochastic processes fktg and fptg, and r > 0 is the
common discount rate.
8
As long as no lump-sum cost arrives, the belief evolves smoothly with innitesimal
increment dpt =  Kt pt(1   pt) dt where Kt = PNn=1 kn;t is the overall intensity of
experimentation, and  = 1   0. If any of the players incurs a lump-sum cost at time
t, the belief jumps up from pt  (the limit of beliefs held before the arrival of the lump-sum
cost) to pt = j(pt ) where
j(p) =
1p
(p)
:
Players are restricted to Markov strategies kn: [0; 1] ! [0; 1] with the left limit belief
pt  as the state variable, so that the action player n takes at time t is kn(pt ). We require
each strategy to be left-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz-continuous. This ensures that
each strategy prole (k1; k2; : : : ; kN) induces, for any prior p, a well-dened law of motion
for players' common beliefs and well-dened total expected costs un(pjk1; k2; : : : ; kN) for
each individual player. These costs are continuous in p on any interval where the overall
intensity of experimentation is positive; jump discontinuities can occur at priors p where
the intensity `lifts o' from its lower bound, being zero at p and positive on ]p   ; p[ .
Furthermore, un is once continuously dierentiable in p on any interval where kn and
K:n =
P
` 6=n k` (the intensity of experimentation carried out by player n's opponents) are
both continuous, and at least one of them is positive; otherwise, un can have a kink.
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A strategy kn is a cut-o strategy if there is a belief p^ such that kn(p) = 1 for all
p  p^, and kn(p) = 0 otherwise. As an example, consider an innitely impatient agent
who merely weighs the short-run cost from playing the safe arm, s, against the expected
short-run cost from playing the risky arm, (p)h. Such an agent would optimally use the
myopic cut-o belief
pm =
s  0h
h
;
playing R for p  pm, and S for p > pm.
When the players act cooperatively so as to minimize the average total cost per player,
their common value function UN is concave and continuous. Concavity reects a non-
negative value of information, and implies continuity in the open unit interval. Continuity
at the boundaries follows from the fact that UN(p) is bounded above by the myopic cost
(p)h ^ s and bounded below by the full-information cost ps+(1  p)0h, both of which
converge to 0h = U

N(0) as p! 0, and to s = UN(1) as p! 1.
Moreover, UN solves the Bellman equation
u(p) = s+ min
K2[0;N ]
K fc(p)=N   b(p; u)g ; (1)
8We shall see below that such kinks always occur in equilibrium, whereas jumps are ruled out.
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where K is the intensity of experimentation,
c(p) = (p)h  s
is the expected current cost increase from playing R rather than S, and
b(p; u) =
h
 p(1  p)u0(p)  (p) [u(j(p))  u(p)]
i
=r
is the expected learning benet of playing R. In fact, the term  K p(1  p)u0(p)=r in
the Bellman equation (1) captures the marginal improvement in the players' outlook while
they experiment without a breakdown, and the term K(p) [u(j(p)) u(p)]=r the discrete
deterioration at the time of a breakdown. As innitesimal changes of the belief are always
downward, we say that a continuous function u solves the Bellman equation if its left-hand
derivative exists on ]0; 1] and (1) holds on ]0; 1[ when this left-hand derivative is used to
compute b(p; u). The cooperative value function UN is the unique solution satisfying the
boundary conditions u(0) = 0h and u(1) = s.
If the shared extra cost of playing R exceeds the full expected benet, the collectively
optimal choice is K = 0 (all agents use S exclusively), and the cooperative value function
satises u(p) = s. Otherwise, K = N is optimal (all agents use R exclusively), and
u(p) = s+ c(p) Nb(p; u) = (p)h Nb(p; u).
When N  2 players act non-cooperatively, a strategy kn for player n is a best response
against his opponents' strategies k1; : : : ; kn 1; kn+1; : : : ; kN if
un(pjk1; : : : ; kn 1; kn; kn+1; : : : ; kN)  un(pjk1; : : : ; kn 1; kn; kn+1; : : : ; kN)
for all priors p and all strategies kn. The value function from playing a best response
is continuous. Continuity at the boundaries of the unit interval follows from the same
upper and lower bounds as in the cooperative case. Continuity in the interior follows
from the observation that at a belief p where the overall intensity of experimentation
lifts o as described above, any jump discontinuity in un would contradict the optimality
of the strategy player n uses. In fact, un(p ) > un(p) = s would imply costs above s
immediately to the left of p, while un(p ) < un(p) = s would imply that player n could
do better by not playing safe at p.
Moreover, a strategy kn is a best response for player n if and only if the resulting value
function un solves the Bellman equation
un(p) = s K:n(p) b(p; un) + min
kn2[0;1]
kn fc(p)  b(p; un)g ; (2)
and kn(p) achieves the minimum on the right-hand side at each belief p. The benet
of experimentation b(p; un) is then non-negative at all beliefs. In fact, there are three
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cases. If un(p) = s, then this is a global maximum, so we must have a left-hand derivative
u0n(p)  0; as un(j(p))  s, moreover, we nd b(p; un)  0. If un(p) < s and kn(p) = 0
is an optimal action, the Bellman equation (2) implies un(p) = s   K:n(p) b(p; un) and
hence K:n(p) b(p; un) > 0. If un(p) < s and kn(p) = 1 is optimal, the Bellman equation
yields un(p) = (p)h   [K:n(p) + 1] b(p; un); as un(p)  (p)h ^ s  (p)h, this in turn
implies [K:n(p) + 1] b(p; un)  0.
If c(p) > b(p; un), then the optimal action is k

n(p) = 0, and equation (2) implies
un(p) = s  K:n(p) b(p; un)  s  K:n(p) c(p), with a strict inequality if K:n(p) > 0. If
c(p) = b(p; un), then k

n(p) is arbitrary in [0; 1], and un(p) = s   K:n(p) c(p). Finally,
if c(p) < b(p; un), then k

n(p) = 1, and un(p) = s   [K:n(p) + 1] b(p; un) + c(p) < s  
K:n(p) c(p). When player n uses a best response, therefore, his optimal action at a given
belief p depends on whether his value un(p) is above, at, or below the level s K:n(p) c(p).
A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a prole of strategies that are mutually best
responses.
3 Conclusive Breakdowns
Suppose that 0 = 0 so that a good risky machine never breaks down. Then, j(p) = 1
and u(j(p)) = s for all p > 0, which simplies the analysis considerably.
3.1 Cooperative Solution
Fix an initial belief p0 = p and consider the following strategy: all players use the risky
arm until a breakdown occurs, at which point all players irrevocably switch to the safe
arm. With prior probability 1  p, this strategy generates total costs of zero as the risky
machine never fails.
With prior probability p, the machine will fail for the rst time at some random time
 , the lump-sum cost is incurred and the players suer a ow cost of s for evermore; thus,
the total discounted cost per player will be e r

rh
N
+ s

. Taking expectations rst with
respect to the exponentially distributed variable  and then with respect to the unknown
state of the world, we compute the expected total costs per player as N1
r+N1

rh
N
+ s

p.
These costs are smaller than s if and only if p is below the threshold stated in the following
proposition.
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Proposition 1 (Cooperative solution, 0 = 0) If breakdowns are conclusive, the N-
agent cooperative solution has all players use the safe arm above the cut-o belief
pN =
(r +N1)s
(rh+Ns)1
> pm;
and the risky arm below. The cooperative value function is continuous, non-decreasing
and piecewise linear with a single concave kink at pN .
Proof: If the players adopt the stated strategy, then each player's payo is
UN(p) =
(rh+Ns)1
r +N1
p
when p  pN , and UN(p) = s otherwise, implying the stated properties. For p  pN ,
we have s  UN(p) = s + c(p)   Nb(p; UN) and thus b(p; UN)  c(p)N . For p > pN , we
have b(p; UN) = 0 <
c(p)
N
as p > pm. So UN solves the Bellman equation (1), and hence
is the value function for the cooperative problem. At all beliefs, the actions specied in
the proposition achieve the minimum in the Bellman equation, so this common strategy
is optimal.
The linearity of UN to the left of the cut-o p

N reects the fact that the players'
actions are frozen until the random time when, in the bad state of the world, the rst
breakdown resolves all uncertainty. The concave kink at pN reects a positive value of
information around the cut-o.
In view of the fact that either K = 0 or K = N is optimal at any given belief, the
cooperative problem can be viewed as a simple stopping problem. As already mentioned
in the introduction, the failure of smooth pasting at the cut-o pN is then fully in line
with this cut-o being an irregular stopping boundary for the process of posterior beliefs.
What is more, the arguments underlying the proof of Proposition 1 allow us to explain
in a very elementary fashion why there cannot be smooth pasting at the socially optimal
cut-o. To the right of it, in fact, the benet of experimentation b(p; u) must be zero
because, with u(p) = u(j(p)) = s and u0(p) = 0, both the `slide benet'  p(1 p)u0(p)=r
and the `jump disbenet' (p) [s u(p)]=r vanish. The latter is continuous in p, so for the
benet of experimentation to cover the shared cost increment c(p)=N > 0 at the cut-o,
the slide disbenet must be positive there, which requires a positive left-hand derivative.9
9In the good-news scenario of Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), by contrast, there are a slide disbenet
and a jump benet, and as we approach the optimal cut-o from within the stopping region, the jump
benet increases to the point where it alone suces to cover the shared opportunity costs of experimen-
tation, so that the slide disbenet { and hence the derivative of the value function { can indeed be zero
at the optimal cut-o.
12
Instead of smooth pasting, it is the `principle of continuous pasting' that applies here:
amongst all possible common cut-os, the socially optimal one is uniquely pinned down
by the requirement that the cooperative value function be continuous. If all players used
a cut-o p^ > pN , for instance, the average total cost per player would satisfy u(p^) > s =
u(p^+), and vice versa for p^ < pN .
Finally, we note that the value function for the cooperative problem can be recast as
UN(p) = 1hp 
N1
r +N1
(1h  s)p
when p  pN . The rst term, 1hp, is the expected cost of committing to the risky arm,
while the second term captures the option value of being able to change to the safe arm
after the arrival of bad news.
3.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
The players' value functions in any MPE lie in the region of the (p; u)-plane below the
graph of the myopic cost function, 1hp ^ s, and indeed below U1 . Dene
DK:n = f(p; u) 2 [0; 1] IR+ : u = s K:n c(p)g:
For K:n > 0 this is a downward sloping diagonal in the (p; u)-plane that cuts the safe
cost line u = s at the myopic cut-o pm; for K:n = 0, it coincides with the safe cost line.
By the characterization of best responses in Section 2, the ecient actions described
in Proposition 1 are mutually best responses whenever the graph of the cooperative value
function UN is weakly below the diagonal DN 1, that is, at beliefs no higher than
pyN =
(r +N1)s
[rh+ s+ (N   1)1h]1 :
Recall that in this region UN satises the ordinary dierential equation (henceforth ODE)
u(p) = s   Nb(p; u) + c(p), so when UN meets DN 1 we have s   (N   1)c(pyN) =
s Nb(pyN ; UN) + c(pyN), and its slope there is given by b(pyN ; UN) = c(pyN).
The characterization of best responses in Section 2 further entails that in a symmetric
MPE with common value function u, there are three cases: either all players use the safe
arm exclusively and u(p) = s; or they all choose the interior allocation k(p) = s u(p)
(N 1) c(p)
and u satises b(p; u) = c(p) with s  (N   1) c(p) < u(p) < s; or they use the risky arm
exclusively and u(p) = s Nb(p; u) + c(p)  s  (N   1) c(p). We know already that the
latter case arises if and only if p  pyN . Given this threshold, backward induction yields
the following result.
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Proposition 2 (Symmetric MPE, 0 = 0) If breakdowns are conclusive, the N-player
experimentation game has a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium with the com-
mon posterior belief as the state variable. The equilibrium strategy is continuous and
non-increasing, and has all players use the risky arm exclusively for p  pyN . In addition,
there is a threshold belief ~pN > p
y
N with p

1 < ~pN < p

N such that the players choose an
interior allocation for pyN < p < ~pN and use the safe arm exclusively for p  ~pN . The
equilibrium value function is continuous, strictly increasing on [0; ~pN ], and once contin-
uously dierentiable except for a concave kink at ~pN . On [0; p
y
N ], it coincides with the
cooperative value function UN ; on [p
y
N ; ~pN ], it is strictly convex.
Proof: As u(j(p)) = s, the indierence condition c(p) = b(p; u) reduces to an ODE
with the general solution
w(p) = rh+ s  rs
1
+
rs
1
(1  p) ln 1  p
p
+ C (1  p): (3)
Choosing the constant C so that w(pyN) = s   (N   1)c(pyN), we obtain a convex and
increasing function WN for p  pyN with WN(pyN) = UN(pyN), and it follows from value
matching together with b(pyN ;WN) = c(p
y
N) = b(p
y
N ; U

N) that W
0
N(p
y
N) = (U

N)
0(pyN).
Let ~pN be the belief at which this function WN reaches the cost level s, and dene the
Lipschitz-continuous strategy
k(p) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if p  pyN ;
s WN (p)
(N 1) c(p) if p
y
N < p < ~pN ;
0 if p  ~pN :
The function
u(p) =
8>><>>:
UN(p) if p  pyN ;
WN(p) if p
y
N < p < ~pN ;
s if p  ~pN
has the stated properties and satises the Bellman equation
u(p) = s  (N   1)k(p) b(p; u) + min
k2[0;1]
k fc(p)  b(p; u)g
on [0; 1], with the minimum on the right-hand side achieved at k = k(p). This proves
that all players using the above strategy constitutes a symmetric MPE. Uniqueness follows
from continuity of the equilibrium value function, the fact that it necessarily coincides
with UN on [0; p
y
N ], and the fact that it cannot exceed the safe cost level s.
It remains to show that ~pN > p

1. Since in any equilibrium, each player must be at least
as well o as in the single-agent solution, we cannot have ~pN < p

1. Suppose, therefore,
that ~pN = p

1. Then the equilibrium value function u and the single-agent value function
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Figure 1: Value functions of a single agent, a two-person cooperative, and the two-player
symmetric equilibrium (0 = 0)
U1 satisfy  p

1(1  p1)u0(p1)=r = b(p1; u) = c(p1) = b(p1; U1 ) =  p1(1  p1)(U1 )0(p1)=r
and hence u0(p1) = (U

1 )
0(p1). Immediately to the left of p

1, strict convexity of u and
linearity of U1 then imply u > U

1 . This is impossible.
For N = 2, the symmetric MPE is illustrated in Figure 1.
It is remarkable that even though each player optimizes against continuous behaviour
of his opponents, and uses a continuous strategy himself, the resulting value function is
not dierentiable at the belief where experimentation with the risky arm `takes o'. This
lack of smooth pasting at the threshold belief ~pN can be explained in exactly the same
way as in the cooperative problem. To the right of the threshold, both the slide benet
and the jump disbenet of experimentation are zero. At the threshold, the slide benet
must be positive so as to cover the cost increment c(~pN) > 0, and this again requires a
positive left-hand derivative.
That there is smooth pasting at the diagonal DN 1 can also be understood in terms of
the benets and costs of experimentation. This diagonal has been constructed as the locus
of all pairs of a belief and a continuation value such that, when playing a best response
against N   1 opponents who use the risky arm exclusively, the N th player is indierent
between all possible intensities of experimentation. Thus, the benet of experimentation
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exactly osets its cost at pyN { just as it does to the right of this threshold, where all players
use an interior allocation. Given that the jump disbenet and the cost are continuous in
beliefs, therefore, the slide disbenet { and hence the rst derivative of the equilibrium
value function { must also be continuous at pyN .
The equilibrium value function is strictly convex over the range of beliefs ]pyN ; ~pN [
associated with interior allocations (see the curve labelled W2 in Figure 1). Starting from
a prior p in this range, players who are intent on playing the symmetric MPE would
thus reject any free signal about the unknown state of the world that induces a lottery
(centred at p) over beliefs in ]pyN ; ~pN [ . This negative value of information `in the small'
conforms to the familiar observation in multi-agent settings that the positive eect of
additional information on one's own optimization can be overcome by the adverse eect
of the concomitant change in the other agents' behaviour.10 There is no contradiction,
however, with the non-negative value of information `in the large' that manifests itself in
the globally non-negative benet of experimentation b(p; un) along any best response. In
fact, the observation of a risky arm at an intensity k > 0 and over a length of time  > 0
leads to a `non-local' binary lottery with possible outcomes p0 = pe
 k
1 p+pe k and 1. And
as can be seen in Figure 1, the straight line joining the point (p0;W2(p0)) with the point
(1; 1h) is everywhere below the graph of the symmetric equilibrium value function, so
that observing the risky arm indeed lowers total costs on average.
As ~pN > p

1, the equilibrium exhibits an encouragement eect in the sense that it
features experimentation on a strictly larger set of beliefs than would be optimal for
a single agent experimenting in isolation. This eect is well-known from the unique
symmetric MPE in the Brownian model of Bolton and Harris (1999) and in the Poisson
model with inconclusive good news of Keller and Rady (2010). There, intuitively, each
player is willing to experiment beyond the single-agent cut-o because any good news
thus obtained makes all players more optimistic and increases the overall intensity of
experimentation to everyone's benet. When good news is conclusive, however, this
reasoning breaks down: a player who experiences a breakthrough becomes certain of the
good state of the world, and hence cannot learn anything from the opponents' subsequent
use of the risky arm. In Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), equilibrium experimentation
thus stops at the single-agent cut-o p1. The case of conclusive bad news is strikingly
dierent in this respect, therefore. We can easily reconcile this nding with the above
intuition, however, by noting that in the model with conclusive bad news, the absence of
a breakdown represents inconclusive good news, and it is the prospect of generating this
kind of good news that gives the players an incentive to experiment beyond p1.
10The scenario with conclusive good news is dierent in this regard. In the symmetric MPE of Keller,
Rady and Cripps (2005), the value of information `in the small' is always non-negative, and positive in
the entire experimentation region.
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3.3 Asymmetric Equilibria and Welfare Properties
For conclusive good news, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) show that the symmetric MPE
is dominated, in terms of average performance per player, by any asymmetric MPE in
simple strategies; by denition, these are strategies which take values in f0; 1g only and
hence prescribe exclusive use of an arm at any given belief. Such equilibria have players
take turns using the risky arm at beliefs slightly more optimistic than the single-agent cut-
o where { owing to the lack of an encouragement eect { all experimentation stops. This
keeps the intensity of experimentation bounded away from zero as the belief approaches
the single-agent cut-o, whereas the symmetric MPE would see that intensity fall to zero
so rapidly that the single-agent cut-o is actually not reached in nite time. A higher
intensity of experimentation at relatively pessimistic beliefs implies better performance
there, and this improvement `ripples up' to more optimistic beliefs by backward induction.
The ineciency of the symmetric MPE close to the single-agent cut-o is actually so severe
that, even though it might specify a higher aggregate intensity than a simple MPE over
some range of more optimistic beliefs, its average performance remains worse there.11
We shall show that this unambiguous welfare comparison does not carry over to the
scenario with conclusive bad news. The basis for this nding as well as for the construc-
tion of asymmetric equilibria is the observation that with conclusive breakdowns, any
Markov perfect equilibrium of the N -player experimentation game coincides with the co-
operative solution at all beliefs p  pyN . In fact, once the value functions of all the players
have crossed DN 1 from above, the prole of players' best responses is for them all to use
the risky arm until a breakdown occurs. Therefore, below DN 1, each player's equilib-
rium cost function coincides with the cooperative value function UN from Proposition 1.
Asymmetric equilibria can thus also be constructed by backward induction from pyN , and
perform neither better nor worse than the symmetric MPE to the left of this threshold.
Proposition 3 (Welfare comparison, 0 = 0) When breakdowns are conclusive, total
costs per player immediately to the right of the threshold belief pyN are lower in the sym-
metric Markov perfect equilibrium of the N -player experimentation game than in any
equilibrium in simple strategies.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium in simple strategies with average cost function u. Im-
mediately to the right of pyN , this function satises u(p) = s+Kfc(p)=N b(p; u)g for some
K 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N   1g. Recalling the function WN dened in the proof of Proposition 2,
we have u(pyN) = s  (N   1)c(pyN) = WN(pyN) and hence
b(pyN ; u) =
c(pyN)
N
+
s  u(pyN)
K
=

1
N
+
N   1
K

c(pyN) > c(p
y
N) = b(p
y
N ;WN):
11There could be a range of beliefs, for example, where the simple MPE species the intensityK = N 1
while the symmetric MPE has N   1 < K < N .
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This implies u0(pyN) > W
0
N(p
y
N).
In general, the symmetric MPE does not imply lower average costs all the way up
to the belief ~pN at which experimentation takes o. With a view towards providing a
counterexample, we note that when a player is volunteering to experiment with K   1
others, the Bellman equation (equation (2) with K:n(p) = K   1 and kn = 1) gives rise
to the ODE u(p) = s Kb(p; u) + c(p) whose general solution is
vK(p) = U

K(p) + Cv (1  p)
 
1  p
p
!r=K1
with some constant of integration Cv. When a player is free-riding on the experimentation
of K others, the Bellman equation (equation (2) with K:n(p) = K and kn = 0) gives rise
to the ODE u(p) = s Kb(p; u) whose general solution is
fK(p) = s+ Cf (1  p)
 
1  p
p
!r=K1
with a constant Cf . Inspection of the ODEs for vK and fK shows that these functions
are increasing whenever they are below the myopic cost function; their second derivative
has the same sign as the respective constant of integration.
If N = 2, then, as noted above, both players play risky below and to the left of
D1; above and to the right of D1, safe and risky are mutual best responses as long as
the cost function of at least one player (and hence the average cost function u) is below
the level s. As u is increasing over the corresponding range of beliefs, there exists a
threshold p2;1 with p
y
2 < p2;1 < p

2 such that in any simple Markov perfect equilibrium of
the two-player experimentation game, both players play risky when p  py2, one of the two
players is playing risky and the other safe when py2 < p  p2;1, and both are playing safe
when p > p2;1. The assignment of roles within the interval ]p
y
2; p2;1] is arbitrary. Figure 2
illustrates the assignment that leads to the most inequitable cost functions, with player A,
the rst volunteer, subsequently free-riding over the largest possible interval of beliefs.12
More equitable value functions emerge simply by exchanging the roles of free-rider and
volunteer more often, the only constraint being that once one of the value functions is at
12In the labelling of value functions to the right of D1 in Figure 2, the rst subscript refers to the
aggregate intensity of experimentation, K = 1, the second to the identity of the player. Note that when
player B free-rides, he has a value function identical to s (which is trivially of the form f1). Intuitively,
player B will only ever switch from the safe to the risky arm if player A observes no breakdown while he
acts as the rst volunteer. As the burden of experimentation is subsequently borne by player B himself,
player A's experimentation has indeed no option value for player B. This implies that player B is worse
o than A, despite his free-riding when the costs of experimentation are high and experimenting when
they are low.
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Figure 2: Value functions in a two-player asymmetric equilibrium (0 = 0)
the level s, that player is assigned the safe role for all higher beliefs, and the other plays
risky until their value function is also at the level s.
The numerical solutions (using parameter values r = 1; s = 2; h = 8; 1 = 1) illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2 show that it is possible to have ~p2 < p2;1; since W2(~p2) = s = u(p2;1),
this implies that W2(p) > u(p) immediately to the left of p2;1. In general, therefore,
equilibria in simple strategies and the symmetric MPE cannot be compared in terms of
aggregate welfare: while the latter performs better at relatively optimistic beliefs, the
former have the potential to let experimentation take o earlier.
The above construction of a most inequitable equilibrium in simple strategies gener-
alises to games involving more than two players, along the lines of Keller, Rady and Cripps
(2005), Section 6. Figure 3 shows the assignment of actions in the most inequitable MPE
for N = 3. (At and to the left of pN;K at least K of the N players are playing risky; pN;N
can be identied with pyN .) Unlike the two-player situation, the belief above which there is
no experimentation is endogenously determined by how the burden of experimentation is
shared in the interval to the right of where all agents play risky. In the situation depicted
in Figure 3, for example, by changing roles between the free-rider and two volunteers for
beliefs above py3 more frequently, we can increase p3;2 (the switch where aggregate exper-
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Figure 3: Action assignments in a three-player asymmetric equilibrium (0 = 0)
imentation moves up from 1 to 2), with the concomitant increase in p3;1 (the threshold
between no experimentation and some).
Exactly like the symmetric MPE, nally, any equilibrium in simple strategies exhibits
a failure of smooth pasting at the boundary of the experimentation region as well as
the encouragement eect, irrespectively of the number of players. In fact, if player A
is the one to play risky on ]p^; pN;1], and player B the one to take over at p^, then the
requirement that b(pN;1; v1;A)  c(pN;1) implies v01;A(pN;1) > 0 by the same argument as
before.13 As player B has a value equal to s while free-riding, and this value cannot exceed
U1 , moreover, we must have p

1  p^ and hence p1 < pN;1. Clearly, these statements remain
true in any non-simple asymmetric equilibrium that has the players take turns playing
risky immediately to the left of the threshold belief at which experimentation takes o.
4 Inconclusive Breakdowns
Now suppose that 0 > 0, so that even a good machine breaks down occasionally. In this
case, j(p) < 1 for all p < 1, and the benet of an experiment, b(p; u), depends on the
post-jump value u(j(p)).
We rst show that the cooperative solution is again achieved by a common cut-o
strategy, and that the cut-o is uniquely determined by continuous pasting. We then es-
tablish existence of a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (which again exhibits
a failure of smooth pasting) and briey address the problem of constructing asymmetric
equilibria, which is considerably more dicult than in the case of conclusive breakdowns.
13Kinks at more optimistic beliefs are caused by discontinuities in the intensity of experimentation
carried out by a player's opponents and, as such, have nothing to do with a failure of the smooth-pasting
principle. In Figure 2, this remark concerns player A at belief p^, and player B at py2.
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4.1 Cooperative Solution
Suppose that all players behave as in the cooperative solution for conclusive breakdowns,
and switch to the safe arm as soon as one of them observes a breakdown. Then the
expected total costs per player as a function of the initial belief are 
rh
N
+ s
!"
N1
r +N1
p+
N0
r +N0
(1  p)
#
by a straightforward generalisation of the computation leading up to Proposition 1. These
costs are smaller than s if and only if p is below the threshold
pN =
(r +N1)(s  0h)
(rh+Ns)
=
(r +N1)h
(rh+Ns)
pm > pm:
At very optimistic beliefs, switching to the safe arm after a single (inconclusive) breakdown
is clearly suboptimal, so the cooperative solution achieves a lower expected total cost than
the one stated above. We should expect, therefore, that the cooperative will be willing to
experiment to the right of pN . Our next proposition conrms this; its proof shows that
the optimal cut-o is uniquely determined by continuous pasting.14
Proposition 4 (Cooperative solution, 0 > 0) If breakdowns are inconclusive, the N-
agent cooperative solution has all players use the safe arm above a unique cut-o belief
pN > pN , and the risky arm below. The cooperative value function is continuous, concave
and non-decreasing; except for a kink at pN , it is once continuously dierentiable.
Proof: Continuity and concavity of the cooperative value function have already been
established in Section 2.
For arbitrary but xed p^ in the open unit interval, consider the following prole of cut-
o strategies: all players use the safe arm whenever p > p^, and the risky arm otherwise.
Let up^ denote the players' corresponding common payo function. For the common cut-o
p^ to be collectively optimal, up^ must be continuous at p^. We wish to show that a unique
such p^ exists and that the corresponding strategy prole solves the cooperative problem.
The mapping p^ 7! up^(p^) is continuous with limit 1h as p^ tends to 1. For p^ = pm, we
have
upm(p
m) = E
Z 1
0
r e r t min fs; (pt)hg dt

14In the statement of this proposition, we use the same notation for the optimal cut-o as in Propo-
sition 1, although these cut-os are not identical, of course. More precisely, pN should be thought of as
a function of 0 (holding all other model parameters xed), with 0 = 0 leading to the expression given
in Proposition 1. The same remark applies to the threshold beliefs pyN and ~pN in Proposition 2 and its
counterpart, Proposition 5 below.
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where the expectation is taken over the process fptg induced by the given strategy prole
for initial belief p0 = p
m. As min fs; (p)hg < s + h (p   pm)=2 for p 6= pm, the
martingale property of posterior beliefs implies upm(p
m) < s. By the intermediate-value
theorem, therefore, there exists a p^ with pm < p^ < 1 such that up^(p^) = s; let p

N denote
the smallest such belief, and u the corresponding common payo function.
For p  pN , we have s  u(p) = s + c(p)   Nb(p; u) and thus b(p; u)  c(p)N . For
p > pN , we have b(p; u
) = 0 < c(p)
N
as p > pm. So u solves the Bellman equation (1), with
the minimum being achieved by the actions specied in the proposition. Thus, u = UN ,
the cooperative value function, and the stated common strategy is optimal.
If there were another cut-o p^ > pN such that up^(p^) = s, the corresponding payo
function would also coincide with the value function by the arguments just given. As this
is impossible, pN is uniquely pinned down by the continuous-pasting condition up^(p^) = s.
On [0; pN ], the intensity of experimentation equals N , so u

N is continuously dieren-
tiable in this interval by what was said in Section 2. As UN = s on [p

N ; 1], moreover,
concavity implies that UN increases on [0; p

N ].
To establish that there is a kink at pN , we note that on the interval ]j
 1(pN); p

N [ , U

N
solves the ODE
 p(1  p)u0(p) +
h
r
N
+ (p)
i
u(p) = (p)
h
r
N
h+ s
i
(4)
which is obtained from the identity u(p) = s+N fc(p)=N   b(p; u)g by setting u(j(p)) = s
in b(p; u) and rearranging. Letting p tend to pN from below, we see that u
0(pN ) has
the same sign as (pN)
h
r
N
h+ s
i
 
h
r
N
+ (pN)
i
s = r
N
c(pN). This is positive because
pN > p
m.
The general solution to (4) is
u(p) =
 
rh
N
+ s
!"
N1
r +N1
p+
N0
r +N0
(1  p)
#
+ C (1  p)
 
1  p
p
!(r+N0)=N
(5)
where C is a constant of integration. As the value function is at least weakly concave and
the constant C multiplies a strictly convex function, we must have C  0. Therefore, pN
cannot be smaller than the belief at which the linear part of (5) equals s. This establishes
pN  pN .
To prove the strict inequality, suppose that pN = pN (and hence C = 0). Then
UN coincides on [j
 1(pN); p

N ] with the expected cost function associated with the (non-
Markovian) strategy of having all players switch to the safe arm upon the rst breakdown.
As these costs tend to N0
r+N0

rh
N
+ s

> 0h as p tends to zero, this strategy is strictly
suboptimal for small p. As such small p are reached with positive probability under this
22
strategy when we start from a belief in [j 1(pN); p

N ], U

N must be strictly smaller than
the linear part of (5) on this interval { a contradiction.
The intuition for the lack of smooth pasting at the socially optimal cut-o is exactly
the same as in the case of conclusive breakdowns.
4.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
For conclusive breakdowns, we constructed the unique symmetric MPE by pasting to-
gether the candidate value functions corresponding to all players playing risky, using an
interior allocation, and playing safe, respectively. We did so in the manner of backward
induction, moving from lower to higher beliefs p. With inconclusive breakdowns, this is
infeasible because the post-jump value u(j(p)) is no longer xed at 1h (the expected
total cost of a known bad machine) but must itself be determined in equilibrium.
We therefore adopt an alternative approach. Given a belief at which experimentation
takes o, and taking the safe cost level as the initial condition to the right of this belief,
we solve the relevant dierential-dierence equation moving from higher to lower beliefs.
The equilibrium value function is then pinned down uniquely by the requirement that it
lie everywhere in between the single-agent and the cooperative value functions, and hence
tend to 0h as p goes to zero.
15
Proposition 5 (Symmetric MPE, 0 > 0) If breakdowns are inconclusive, the N-player
experimentation game has a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium with the com-
mon posterior belief as the state variable. The equilibrium strategy is continuous and
non-increasing, and there are threshold beliefs pyN > ~pN with p

1 < ~pN < p

N such that all
players play risky for p  pyN , use an interior allocation for pyN < p < ~pN , and play safe
for p  ~pN . The equilibrium value function is continuous, strictly increasing on [0; ~pN ],
and once continuously dierentiable except for a concave kink at ~pN .
Proof: For any ~p 2 [p1; pN ], let u~p : ]0; 1]! IR be the unique solution of the dierential-
dierence equation
b(p; u) = max
n
(p)h u(p)
N
; c(p)
o
(6)
subject to u~p = s on [~p; 1].
15This `shooting' method is the same as in Keller and Rady (2010) except for the complication that we
are trying to `hit' a point where the relevant dierential equation is singular (the coecient of the rst
derivative vanishes at p = 0). We overcome it by rst constructing a sequence of solutions on subintervals
that get closer and closer to p = 0, and then showing existence of a convergent subsequence. Earlier
examples of this approach can be found in Keller and Rady (1999, 2003) and Bonatti (2011).
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We rst show that up1 > U

1 on ]0; p

1[ . Noting that  p

1(1   p1)(up1)0(p1)=r =
b(p1; up1) = c(p

1) = b(p

1; U

1 ) =  p

1(1   p1)(U1 )0(p1)=r, we see that (up1)0(p1) =
(U1 )
0(p1). Immediately to the left of p

1, moreover,
 p(1  p)(up1)0(p)  (p) [s  up1(p)] = r [(p)h  s]
and
 p(1  p)(U1 )0(p)  (p) [s  U1 (p)] = r [(p)h  U1 (p)];
so that the dierence d = up1   U1 solves
 p(1  p)d0(p) + (p)d(p) = r [U1 (p)  s]:
Dierentiating both sides with respect to p and using the fact that d(p1) = d
0(p1) = 0
as well as (U1 )
0(p1) > 0, we see that d
00(p1) > 0, and hence d > 0 immediately to
the left of p1. Now, suppose that there is a belief in ]0; p

1[ at which d  0. Then
there exist p0 < p00 in this interval such that d(p0) = 0, d > 0 on ]p0; p1[ , and the
restriction of d to [p0; 1] assumes a positive global maximum at p00. As d0(p00) = 0 and
d(j(p00))  d(p00), we have b(p00; up1)  b(p00; U1 ); as b(p00; U1 ) > c(p00), moreover, (6)
implies up1(p
00) = (p00)h Nb(p00; up1)  (p00)h  b(p00; U1 ) = U1 (p00) { a contradiction.
Analogous steps establish that upN < U

N on ]0; p

N [ . By continuous dependence
of u~p on ~p, we can now nd beliefs ~p` 2 ]p1; pN [ for ` = 1; 2; : : : such that u` = u~p`
satises UN(`
 1)  u`(` 1)  U1 (` 1). By the same argument as above, in fact, we have
UN  u`  U1 on [` 1; 1]. Selecting a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that
the beliefs ~p` converge monotonically to some limit ~p1. If ~p` decreases with `, we set
I` = ]`
 1; p1[ ; otherwise we set I` = ]` 1; p`[ . In either case, I`+1  I` for all `, andS1
`=1 I` = ]0; p1[ .
Next, we note that for each `, there exists a constant C` > 0 such that the following
holds for any function u : ]0; 1] ! IR satisfying UN  u  U1 : if u solves (6) on I`, then
ju0j  C` on this interval. In fact, the stated conditions imply both
 p(1  p)u0(p)  (p) [U1 (j(p))  UN(p)] + rmax
n
(p)h UN (p)
N
; c(p)
o
and
 p(1  p)u0(p)  (p) [UN(j(p))  U1 (p)] + rmax
n
(p)h U1 (p)
N
; c(p)
o
in I`, from which the claim follows immediately.
This in turn implies that for any L = 1; 2; : : :, the sequences fu`g`L and fu0`g`L
are uniformly bounded and equicontinuous on IL. Repeatedly applying the Arzela-Ascoli
theorem and then selecting the `diagonal' subsequence, we obtain a sequence of functions
fuLg1L=1 and a limit function ~u such that uL converges pointwise to ~u on ]0; 1] and u0L
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converges uniformly on each closed subinterval of ]0; ~p1[ . On the latter interval, therefore,
~u is once continuously dierentiable and solves (6); on [~p1; 1], we obviously have ~u = s.
As UN  ~u  U1 on ]0; 1], nally, we can extend ~u continuously to the closed unit interval
by setting ~u(0) = 0h.
From now, on we write ~pN instead of ~p1. In view of what was shown at the start of
this proof, we have p1 < ~pN < p

N . Letting p tend to ~pN from below in (6), we see that
~u0(~pN ) has the same sign as c(~pN), which is positive since ~pN > p1 > pm.
We wish to establish that ~u is strictly increasing on [0; ~pN ]. Suppose that this is not
the case. Then there exist beliefs p0 > q0 in ]0; ~pN [ such that ~u(p0)   ~u(q0)  0 is the
minimum of ~u(p)  ~u(q) on f(p; q) 2 [0; 1]2 : p  qg. As ~u0(p0) = 0, (6) yields
(p0) [~u(j(p0))  ~u(p0)] + rmax
n
(p0)h ~u(p0)
N
; c(p0)
o
= 0:
As ~u(p0)  U1 (p0) < (p0)h, this implies ~u(j(p0)) < ~u(p0) and hence ~u(j(p0))   ~u(q0) <
~u(p0)  ~u(q0). As j(p0) > p0 > q0, this is a contradiction.
Now, let pyN = inffp : ~u(p) > s   (N   1) c(p)g and set ~k(p) = 1 for p  pyN ,
~k(p) = s u(p)
(N 1) c(p) for p
y
N < p < ~pN , and
~k(p) = 0 for p  ~pN . This strategy is non-
increasing and Lipschitz-continuous. It is straightforward to verify that all players using
this strategy constitutes a symmetric equilibrium with value function ~u.
To establish uniqueness of the symmetric MPE, it is useful to note that the players'
common value function in any such equilibrium must solve the variational inequality
max

b(p; u) max
n
(p)h u(p)
N
; c(p)
o
; u(p)  s

= 0: (7)
To see that this is the case, suppose that all players using a strategy k constitutes a
symmetric MPE with equilibrium value function u, and consider the three cases that
are possible according to the characterization of best responses in Section 2. First, if
k(p) = 0 and u(p) = s, then (7) holds if and only if b(p; u)  max
n
c(p)
N
; c(p)
o
; as
b(p; u)  0, this inequality is tantamount to b(p; u)  c(p), which must hold because
otherwise k(p) = 0 would not be a best response against the other N   1 players using
the safe arm exclusively. Second, if 0 < k(p) < 1 and u satises b(p; u) = c(p) with
s  (N   1) c(p) < u(p) < s, then (7) holds because max
n
(p)h ~u(p)
N
; c(p)
o
= c(p). Third,
if k(p) = 1 and u(p) = s   Nb(p; u) + c(p)  s   (N   1) c(p), then (7) holds because
b(p; u)  c(p) and max
n
(p)h u(p)
N
; c(p)
o
= max fb(p; u); c(p)g = b(p; u).
Clearly, ~u solves (7). Suppose that u is also a solution with u(0) = 0h and u(1) = s.
Then a straightforward extension of the arguments given at the start of the proof shows
that u   ~u assumes neither a positive maximum nor a negative minimum. So we must
have u = ~u as claimed.
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The explanations for the kink of the equilibrium value function at ~pN , for smooth
pasting at pyN and for the encouragement eect (that is, ~pN > p

1) are the same as in the
case of conclusive breakdowns.
Immediately to the left of ~pN , (6) has the general solution
w(p) = s+
r
1
(1h  s)p  r
0
(s  0h)(1  p) + C (1  p)
 
1  p
p
!0=
;
which is strictly convex if and only if C > 0. Under the value-matching condition w(~pN) =
s, this is equivalent to
~pN <
1

s  0h
s
:
As the right-hand side of this inequality tends to 1 as 0 ! 0, we see that the equilibrium
value function is strictly convex immediately to the left of ~pN at least for small 0. As in
the case of conclusive breakdowns, therefore, a non-negative value of information `in the
large' can co-exist with a negative value of information `in the small'.
4.3 Asymmetric Equilibria
The construction of asymmetric Markov perfect equilibria for inconclusive breakdowns is
considerably more dicult than for conclusive ones because we can no longer use back-
ward induction from the belief at which all players start using the risky arm. Moreover,
asymmetric actions (and hence asymmetric total expected costs) on some interval of be-
liefs I necessarily imply asymmetric post-jump continuation values on the interval of
more optimistic beliefs j 1(I); and as more optimism translates into a higher intensity of
experimentation, the latter interval will be reached with positive probability.
In the scenario with inconclusive good news, by contrast, the beliefs in j 1(I) are more
pessimistic than those in I; if the interval I on which players take asymmetric actions is
close to the belief at which all experimentation stops in equilibrium, the interval j 1(I)
is never reached. This allows Keller and Rady (2010) to construct asymmetric equilibria
for an arbitrary number of players in which actions and total payos are symmetric
everywhere except on some interval of beliefs where the players take turns playing risky;
see their Proposition 5.
On the path of play in these equilibria, the players always have symmetric continuation
values after a breakthrough. If the last experimenter is instead rewarded with a higher
payo after a breakthrough, equilibrium experimentation can be sustained on a larger
range of beliefs, as Keller and Rady (2010) illustrate for 0 close to zero by means of
numerically computed two-player equilibria in simple strategies; see their Section 7. The
method used to construct these equilibria carries over to the present framework with two
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modications: on the one hand, there is no need to require that 0 be close to zero; on
the other hand, the construction is more involved in that we again have to solve for the
cost functions by `shooting' into the singularity at p = 0, which can be done as for the
symmetric MPE.
The details of this construction are available upon request. We do not present them
here because it is clear from our earlier arguments that these asymmetric equilibria again
exhibit a failure of smooth pasting at the belief where the rst experimenter starts using
the risky arm.
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to identify and explain the dierences between the bad-news
and good-news versions of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. Consequently,
we did not address results that are common to both versions and can be proved exactly
as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010). These include the non-
existence of equilibria in cut-o strategies and (for inconclusive news) the representation
of equilibrium value functions in a recursive closed form.
We maintained the assumption made in these earlier papers that the size of a lump-
sum payo or cost conveys no information about the state of the world. If this size were
informative, it would no longer be exogenously predetermined whether a news event makes
the players more optimistic or more pessimistic. In such a model, it would be impossible,
therefore, to construct equilibrium payo functions iteratively by moving against the
direction of jumps in beliefs, as we did in Section 4. The variational inequality (7) that
we used to prove uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium would still hold, however, and
could provide a starting point for an existence and uniqueness proof based on the theory
of viscosity solutions, for example. We intend to explore this in future work.
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